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K 
iobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. involves an ac-
tion under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The case was 
brought in the United States, Southern District of New 
York, by the widow of Dr.  Barinem Kiobel, a Nigerian 
activist and member of the Ogoni tribe, and others for human rights viola-
tions committed in the Niger River Delta.  Defendants include Royal 
Dutch Petroleum, Shell Transport and Trading Co., and Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria.  Although the human rights violations 
including murder and torture were allegedly committed by the Nigerian 
military government, it is claimed that the Royal Dutch Petroleum defend-
ants aided and abetted the Nigerian military in the human rights viola-
tions. The plaintiffs had engaged in protests about the environmental dam-
age caused by the Royal Dutch Petroleum defendants in the area of the 
Niger Delta and the plight of the Ogoni people in Ogoniland.  At the trial 
level, the court decided that certain claims involving violations of the Law 
of Nations could be heard by the court. However, the case was appealed to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, which decided that there is a presumption 
against extraterritoriality in the application of the ATS, and that “mere 
presence” of a defendant corporation in the United States is insufficient for 
a court to assume jurisdiction. However, the question remains: What cor-
porate presence would serve as a sufficient basis for a court to assume juris-
diction under the ATS?  Given the possibility that corporations could, and 
perhaps in the future will, be found liable for human rights violations 
occurring in foreign locales even after Kiobel, prudent risk management 
behooves corporations and their counsel to monitor whether human rights 
violations are occurring in connection with their operations, even when those 
human rights violations are committed by foreign governments or their 
agents.  
Keywords: Kiobel; Alien Tort Statute; extraterritoriality; human 
rights; risk management 
 
Kiobel v.  Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.  (133 S. Ct. 1659, decided 
April 17, 2013) involves an action under the Alien Tort Statute 
(28 U.S.C. 1350; ATS).The case was brought in the United 
States, Southern District of New York, by the widow of Dr. 
Barinem Kiobel, a Nigerian activist and member of the Ogoni 
tribe, and others for human rights violations committed in the 
Niger River Delta. Defendants include Royal Dutch Petroleum, 
Shell Transport and Trading Co., and Shell Petroleum Devel-
opment Company of Nigeria. Although the human rights viola-
tions including murder and torture were allegedly committed 
by the Nigerian military government, it is claimed that the Roy-
al Dutch Petroleum defendants aided and abetted the Nigerian 
military in the human rights violations. The plaintiffs had en-
gaged in protests about the environmental damage caused by 
the Royal Dutch Petroleum defendants in the area of the Niger 
Delta and the plight of the Ogoni people in Ogoniland.1    
The Alien Tort Claims Act  
The Alien Tort Statute of 1789 (ATS, also known as Alien Tort 
Claims Act or ATCA) provides:  “The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States”  (28 U.S.C. 1350). 
The courts developed modern jurisdictional rules for the 
application of the ATS beginning with the Filartiga case (630 
F.2d 876, 2nd 1980). During the regime of Paraguay President 
Alfredo Stroessner, Inspector General of Police Americo 
Norberto Pena-Irala tortured the brother of plaintiffs Filartiga 
to death in Paraguay, allegedly in retaliation for the family’s 
opposition to the incumbent regime. Subsequently both Pena 
and the plaintiffs Filartiga moved to the United States. When 
plaintiff Filartiga learned of Pena’s presence in the United 
States, she sued Pena in the Eastern District of New York, 
under the ATCA, alleging torture in violation of the Law of 
Nations. The Eastern District of New York dismissed the case 
on the grounds that the court could not exercise jurisdiction 
over Pena-Irala. However the Second Circuit reversed, on the 
grounds that torture violates the Law of Nations, and that the 
ATS grants jurisdiction to U.S. courts for violations of the Law 
of Nations. In the Filartiga case, the U.S. courts exercised per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant Pena-Irala for acts com-
mitted in a foreign territory. The Filartiga court noted: “It is 
not extraordinary for a court to adjudicate a tort claim arising 
outside of its territorial jurisdiction (630 F 2nd at 885).” Later, 
in 2004, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (542 US 692), the U.S. Su-
preme Court reviewed the legislative history of the ATS of 
1789. The Supreme Court interpreted the ATS as a jurisdiction-
al statute for claims arising from law of nations, and treaties of 
United States. 
Procedural History of  the Kiobel Case 
The Kiobel complaint was initially brought in Federal District 
court for the Southern District of New York. The trial court 
decided that the plaintiffs stated claims could be heard under 
the ATS for torture, crimes against humanity, and arbitrary 
arrest and detention (456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 2006), and that 
claims alleging aiding and abetting for cognizable claims under 
the ATS were also viable. Other claims were dismissed by the 
trial court because the claims were not recognized as violations 
of the Law of Nations. The case was appealed, and the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals (621 F.3d 111, 2010) reversed on the 
grounds that corporations are not liable under the ATS. Certio-
rari was granted in by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Kiobel case 
was argued during the 2011 term, then reargued during the 
2012 term to address the question “[w]hether and under what 
circumstances the Alien Tort Statute…allows courts to recog-
nize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations oc-
curring within the territory of a sovereign other than the Unit-
ed States.”  In April 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that 
there was a presumption against extraterritorial application of 
the ATS, and that “mere presence” of a defendant corporation 
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in the United States is insufficient to overcome the presump-
tion against extraterritorial application of the ATS.  
Open Questions after Kiobel 
Post Kiobel, the question now arises whether corporations can 
conduct their operations abroad in the expectation that they 
will not be liable for human rights violations committed by 
foreign governments or whether they must manage their opera-
tions so as to avoid the risk of aiding and abetting liability for 
human rights violations touching on their operations. Several 
issues remain open. This is particularly important in view of 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Kiobel, which states:  
“The opinion for the Court is careful to leave open a number 
of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation 
of the Alien Tort Statute.” Although the judgment of the Court 
was unanimous, four Justices, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, So-
tomayor, and Kagan, filed a concurring opinion, which sets out 
a different rationale.   
Unlike the Court, I would not invoke the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality. Rather, guided in part 
by principles and practices of foreign relations law, I 
would find jurisdiction under this statute   where (1) 
the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the de-
fendant is an American national, or (3) the defend-
ant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an 
important American national interest,  and that in-
cludes a distinct interest in preventing the United 
States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as 
well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other com-
mon enemy of mankind. 
Indeed, William Dodge (2013) opines “that the Court’s 
language on corporate presence ‘should send chills down the 
spines of corporations domiciled in the United States (and their 
general counsels).’”  
Corporate Presence Justifying  
Jurisdiction 
The majority in its language, "even where the claims touch and 
concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with 
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterri-
torial application” leaves open the question of how claims must 
“touch and concern the territory of the United States” and with 
what force to justify the assumption of jurisdiction by the 
courts under the ATS. Ingrid Wuerth (2013) analyzed the ma-
jority opinion in Kiobel that because corporations are often 
“present” in many countries, their presence alone does not 
suffice to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial 
application of the ATS. Wuerth suggests that “the physical 
presence of individual defendants or the incorporation of legal 
entities under domestic state law” might provide the presence 
sufficient to justify the assumption of jurisdiction under the 
ATS even where such jurisdiction concerns actions that oc-
curred outside the territory of the United States.  
In addition, Judge Pierre Leval (2013, 16) has suggested 
that state courts could provide a forum for the litigation of 
claims of human rights violations committed even by foreign 
governments.2 Doe v. Unocal is such a case. Doe v. Unocal is a pre-
Kiobel case involving a complaint brought under the ATS by 
Burmese villagers who complained of human rights violations 
including forced labor, murder, torture, and rape against United 
Oil Company of California (Unocal), which was conducting 
operations in Burma/Myanmar in a joint venture with French 
company Total. Unocal, the defendant, is a legal entity incorpo-
rated under the laws of California. The case was prosecuted in 
the California state courts under the ATS. Doe v. Unocal was 
settled once the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decided to rehear 
the case en banc. Based on Unocal’s presence in the United 
States, its status as a legal entity of the country and of the state 
of California, and given the majority analysis in Kiobel that the 
United States not give sanctuary to criminals as well as Justice 
Breyer’s concurring opinion that defendant’s status as  “an 
American national ” provides a basis for liability under the 
ATS, it is likely that Unocal is the type of case that would sur-
vive a Kiobel analysis, overcoming the presumption against ex-
traterritorial application of the ATS.  Even if Doe v.  Unocal 
would not survive a Kiobel analysis leading to the assumption 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the U.S. federal courts, the 
courts of California might assume jurisdiction under state law 
as suggested above by Judge Pierre Leval.  
  In its Kiobel decision, the U.S. Supreme Court never 
addressed the liability of corporations under the ATS, the ra-
tionale on which the Second Circuit overruled the trial court 
decision of the Southern District of New York. However, Citi-
zens United v. Federal Elections Commission (558 U.S. 310, 2010) 
establishes that corporations and other associations that are not 
“natural persons” are nonetheless legal persons under U.S. law 
(providing corporations with constitutionally based right of 
political free speech).3  It is likely that corporations qua corpo-
rations could be liable for human rights violations under the 
ATS. 
Indeed, foreign sovereigns, including both the UK and the 
Netherlands, submitted amicus curiae briefs, arguing that the 
assumption of jurisdiction by the courts of the United States 
under the ATS was unnecessary because they provided an ap-
propriate forum for the litigation of the claims in Kiobel.  Royal 
Dutch Petroleum is a corporation of the Netherlands; defend-
ant Shell Transport and Trading Co. is a joint venture, incorpo-
rated in the United Kingdom. The UK and the Netherland 
argued that the courts where the defendant corporations are 
citizens were the appropriate forum for litigating the plaintiffs’ 
claims.4    
Political Risk and ATS exposure 
Given the possibility that corporations could, and perhaps in 
the future will, be found liable for human rights violations oc-
curring in foreign locales even after Kiobel, prudent risk man-
agement behooves corporations and their counsel to monitor 
whether human rights violations are occurring in connection 
with their operations, even when those human rights violations 
are committed by foreign governments or their agents. It 
would be imprudent to assume the attitude embodied by Total 
and Unocal, expressed by a Total executive to Unocal (395 
F.3d 932, 9th Cir. 2002):  
By stating that I could not guarantee that the army is 
not using forced labour, I certainly imply that they 
might, (and they might) but I am saying that we do 
not have to monitor army's behavior: we have our 
responsibilities; they have their responsibilities; and 
we refuse to be pushed into assuming more than 
what we can really guarantee. About forced labour 
used by the troops assigned to provide security on 
our pipeline project, let us admit between Unocal 
and Total that we might be in a grey zone.  
Risks may be greatest in the energy sector and in less eco-
nomically developed nations. The mining of energy is a sector 
where the demand of economically developing nations includ-
ing China and India is stimulating global operations by corpo-
rations. Much of the mining operations occur in less economi-
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cally developed countries, some of which are governed by mili-
tary or nondemocratic regimes. Several of the cases arising 
under the ATS involved energy companies, including the Kiobel 
case, Wiwa case, Unocal case, and Botowo v. Chevron.5  Guidance 
is given by the Equator Principles, which were adopted by the 
International Finance Corporation World Bank Group and 
incorporate social and environmental principles into Project 
Finance. The Equator Principles are envisioned for big project 
financing involving multiple partners, such as in the Unocal 
and Total operations in Burma, the Royal Dutch Petroleum 
and Shell Companies in Nigeria, and Texaco oil drilling opera-
tions in Ecuador.6 Appropriate risk management by interna-
tional energy companies requires that they manage the terms of 
engagement for their operations so as to minimize human 
rights violations and even environmental torts.7   
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